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Abstract
We conduct an experimental analysis of a best-of-three Tullock contest. Intermediate
prizes lead to higher efforts, while increasing the role of luck (as opposed to effort) leads to
lower efforts. Both intermediate prizes and luck reduce the probability of contest ending in two
rounds. The patterns of players‟ efforts and the probability that a contest ends in two rounds is
consistent with „strategic momentum‟, i.e. momentum generated due to strategic incentives
inherent in the contest. We do not find evidence for „psychological momentum‟, i.e. momentum
which emerges when winning affects players‟ confidence. Similar to previous studies of contests,
we find significantly higher efforts than predicted and strong heterogeneity in effort between
subjects.
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1. Introduction
Many contests feature a best-of-N structure. An economic analysis of best-of-N contests
offers several interesting predictions about the pattern of effort exerted by players during the
various rounds of the contest. This, in turn, implies predictions about the pattern of outcomes for
these contests. Much of the extant empirical literature focuses on sports contests. Because it is
typically difficult to measure the actual effort expended by players in sports contests, almost all
these studies focus solely on whether the pattern of outcomes is consistent with the theoretical
predictions (Mosteller 1952; Jackson 1993; Ferrall and Smith, 1999; McFall et al. 2009; Page
2009; Malueg and Yates 2010). However, this methodology provides only an indirect measure of
effort. In this paper, we use laboratory experiments to obtain direct empirical evidence on the
pattern of effort and outcomes in a best-of-three contest.
Consider a best-of-three contest between two ex-ante symmetric players. The first player
to win two rounds is the contest winner. Let the probability of winning a round be a function of
the players‟ effort and luck. Economic theory suggests that both players will exert equal effort in
the first round and equal effort again in the third round (if one occurs). In the second round, the
relative efforts are determined by the parameters of the contest. In our baseline treatment, the
winner of the first round has a higher effective value associated with winning the second round,
and hence will exert more effort. Translating effort into outcomes implies that both players are
equally likely to win the first round. The winner of the first round is more likely to win the
second round; but if the contest goes to the third round, then both players are once again equally
likely to win. Thus, the outcome of the first round has an asymmetric effect on the second round
efforts by ex-ante symmetric players, and equilibrium play explains the emergence of „hot hand‟
(winning streak that occurs more often than predicted by chance). We say that the winner of the
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first round exhibits „strategic momentum‟ in the second round to reinforce the idea that this
increase in the probability of winning is a consequence of the strategic incentives inherent in the
contest.
In addition to strategic momentum, players in a best-of-three contest may also exhibit
„psychological momentum.‟ There is no single definition of psychological momentum, but it is
often based on the maxim „success breads success,‟ i.e., winning a round affects players‟
confidence and makes them more likely to win the next round (Baker, Gibbs and Homstrom,
1994a, 1994b; Dorsey-Palmeteer and Smith, 2004, Vallerand et al., 1988; Kerick et al., 2000).
Given their varying impact on effort choices and outcomes, it is important to distinguish between
strategic and psychological momentum. Our first piece of evidence to distinguish between the
two momentums lies in the structure of the best-of-three contest itself. Specifically, in the third
round the optimal strategy for both players is to exert equal effort (no strategic momentum).
However, if we observe that the winner of the second round is more likely to win the third round,
then this is evidence in support of psychological momentum. To obtain additional validation, we
employ a treatment with parameters such that there is no strategic momentum in any round. In
this case, if we observe that the winner of the first round is more likely to win the second round,
then again this is evidence in support of psychological momentum.
Our experimental design also encompasses comparative statics for two treatment
variables. The first variable is an intermediate prize for winning an individual round. Theory
predicts that intermediate prizes leads to an increase in effort, and a decrease in the probability of
contest ending in two rounds. The second treatment variable is the degree to which luck rather
than effort determines the winner of a round. Theory predicts that an increase in the role of luck
leads to a decrease in effort and a decrease in the probability of contest ending in two rounds.

3

Existing experimental studies of contests investigate a diverse array of issues such as
entry costs, player asymmetry, effect of carryover, risk aversion, multiple prizes, etc (e.g.,
Millner and Pratt, 1989, 1991; Potters et al., 1998; Davis and Reilly, 1998; Anderson and
Stafford, 2003; Schmitt et al., 2004; Fonseca, 2009; Anderson and Freeborn, 2010; Sheremeta,
2010a). However, most experimental studies consider contests lasting only one round. Studies on
multiple round contests are few and relatively recent. For instance, Zizzo (2002) examines the
aggressiveness of players in a multi-stage patent race. Sheremeta (2010b) compares expenditures
in a multi-round elimination contest to a single-round contest. We extend the literature by
examining patterns of effort and outcomes in a contest with the best-of-three structure. We also
contribute to the theoretical literature by analyzing the impact of intermediate prizes, and test the
comparative statics predictions with respect to both intermediate prizes and luck.
Almost without exception, the existing experimental studies provide evidence of contest
expenditure that is in excess of Nash equilibrium levels, but which is consistent with various
models‟ comparative statics results. Our results fall in line with this general trend. We find
strong support for our comparative statics predictions, but we also find significantly higher
efforts than predicted and strong heterogeneity in effort between subjects. We discuss a number
of possible explanations for these findings. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our results for
the pattern of efforts and outcomes are consistent with strategic momentum. We do not find any
evidence for psychological momentum.

2. Theoretical Model
Before analyzing a best-of-three contest, it is useful to review a single round Tullock
contest. There are two risk-neutral, equally-skilled players i and j. The players select effort xi and
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xj to win the contest. The contest success function p(xi, xj) specifies the probability that player i
wins the contest as a function of players‟ efforts. Following Tullock (1980), we have
p(xi, xj) = xir/(xir + xjr).

(1)

The exponent r can be interpreted as the „decisiveness parameter‟ (Hirshleifer, 1995) or the
„contest intensity‟ (Weimann et al., 2000), and reflects how sensitive the probability of winning
is to the players‟ relative expenditure. It can also be interpreted as the degree of „luck‟ in the
contest. As r decreases, luck plays a more important role. As r approaches zero, each player wins
a given round with probability 1/2, regardless of effort. We assume that 0 < r ≤ 1 which ensures
that the contest success function is concave in a player‟s expenditure and that a unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
If player i‟s value for winning the contest is V and player j‟s value for winning the contest
is W then the expected payoff to player i is
E(πi) = pV – xi,

(2)

and the expected payoff to player j is
E(πj) = (1 – p)W – xj.

(3)

That is, the probability of winning times the value of the prize minus the effort expended.
Following Malueg and Yates (2005), we can write the Nash equilibrium efforts as
xi* = rρrV/(1 + ρr)2 and xj* = rρrW/(1 + ρr)2,

(4)

where ρ = W/V is the ratio of players‟ value of winning the contest. Note that the ratio of players‟
efforts is equal to the ratio of their values.
Returning to a best-of-three contest, players i and j face each other in as many as three
successive rounds.1 The first player to win two rounds is the contest winner. In each round,

1

Klumpp and Polborn (2006) provide a theoretical analysis of a best-of-three contest. We extend their work by
including intermediate prizes.
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players select efforts xi and xj. The probability that player i wins a round is given by (1). Both
players value winning the contest at v, and there is an additional intermediate prize d for winning
individual rounds. To characterize the players‟ effort choices, we apply backward induction. Let
Vi(m,n) be the expected payoff to player i when player i needs to win m more rounds to win the
contest and player j needs to win n more rounds to win the contest.
The backward induction argument starts with the third round. Here, both players have
won one round each. The winner of the third round receives the final prize v for winning the
overall contest, and an intermediate prize d for winning the third round. The loser of the third
round receives 0. Therefore the expected payoff for player i in the third round is given by
Vi(1,1) = p(v + d – xi) + (1 – p)(– xi) = p(v + d) – xi,

(5)

and the expected payoff for player j in the third round is given by
Vj(1,1) = (1 – p)(v + d – xj) + p(– xj) = (1 – p)(v + d) – xj.

(6)

This is equivalent to a single-round Tullock contest in which player i‟s value of winning is V = v
+ d and player j‟s value of winning is W = v + d. From (2), the third round Nash equilibrium
efforts are
x1* = x2* = r(v + d)/4.

(7)

Both players exert equal effort because they have the same value for winning the round. Their
expected payoffs can be found by substituting these expressions back into the equations for
Vi(1,1) and Vj(1,1).
Next we take a step backwards to analyze the second round. One player will have won
the first round and the other will have lost. Without loss of generality, assume that player i has
won and player j has lost the first round. If player i wins the second round the contest concludes;
player i receives the final prize v for winning the overall contest and an intermediate prize d for
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winning the second round while player j receives zero. If, however, player j wins the second
round the contest moves to the third round, and player i receives the third round expected payoff
Vi(1,1) while player j receives an intermediate prize d and the third round expected payoff
Vj(1,1). Therefore, the expected payoff for player i in the second round is
Vi(1,2) = p(v + d – xi) + (1 – p)(Vi(1,1) – xi) = Vi(1,1) + p(v + d – Vi(1,1)) – xi,

(8)

and the expected payoff for player j in the second round is
Vi(1,2) = (1 – p)(d + Vj(1,1) – xj) + p(– xj) = (1 – p)(Vj(1,1) + d) – xj.

(9)

This is equivalent to a single-round Tullock contest in which player i‟s value of winning is V = v
+ d – Vi(1,1) and player j‟s value of winning is W = d + Vj(1,1).2 The Nash equilibrium efforts in
the second round can be found by substituting these values into (2). If the intermediate prize is
zero, then it is easy to show player i has a higher value of winning the second round than player
j. This in turn implies that player i will exert greater effort than player j, and accordingly, is more
likely to win the second round (and the overall contest). For other values of intermediate prize (d
> 0), it is possible for both players to exert equal effort, or for player j to exert more effort than
player i. In cases where player i exerts more effort than player j, we have strategic momentum.3
By symmetry, if player i has lost rather than won the first round, then
Vi(2,1) = Vj(1,2) and Vj(2,1) = Vi(1,2)

(10)

Finally, we consider the first round. If player i wins the first round, she receives the
intermediate prize d and the expected payoff Vi(1,2). If player i loses the first round, she receives
the expected payoff Vi(2,1). Therefore, the expected payoff for player i in the first round is
Vi(2,2) = p(d+Vi(1,2)-xi)+(1-p)(Vi(2,1)-xi) = Vi(2,1)+p(d+Vi(1,2)-Vi(2,1))-xi,

(11)

and the expected payoff for player j in the first round is
2

Note that the value Vi(1,1) is the expected payoff in round 3 and does not depend on the effort xi in the current
round.
3
Strategic momentum exists if d > rv/(2-r).
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Vj(2,2) = (1-p)(d+Vj(2,1)-xj)+p(Vj(1,2)-xj) = Vj(1,2)+(1-p)(d+Vj(2,1)-Vj(1,2))-xi.

(12)

This is equivalent to a single round Tullock contest in which V = (d+Vi(1,2)-Vi(2,1)) and W =
(d+Vj(2,1)-Vj(1,2)). Using (10), we see that V = W. Once again players have equal values for
winning the round and so they exert equal effort in the first round.4
The theoretical model illustrates how strategic momentum results from equilibrium play.
However, laboratory experiments feature human subjects who may also experience
psychological momentum. Psychological literature suggests that psychological momentum can
be bi-directional (e.g. Vallerand et al., 1988; Kerick et al., 2000). This means that the
„encouraged‟ winner of a given round may experience positive psychological momentum and the
„discouraged‟ loser may experience negative psychological momentum. A simple way to
incorporate this idea into a best-of-three contest is to assume that psychological momentum leads
the winner of a given round to exert more effort in the next round than the loser of a given round.
Thus, psychological momentum may occur in both the second and third round, regardless of the
underlying parameter values.

3. Experimental Environment
3.1. Experimental Design and Hypotheses
Table 1 summarizes the experimental parameters. We employ three features: “H” denotes
a high exponent in the contest success function, “L” denotes a low exponent, and “I” denotes an
intermediate prize. In our baseline HI treatment, the success exponent is high (r = 1) and there is
an intermediate prize for winning an individual round (d = 25). We include two control
4

Also note that although the players are symmetric both in round 1 and round 3, their value of winning the first
round is lower than the value of winning the third and final round. Therefore, if the contest goes to the third round,
both players exert greater effort than in earlier rounds.
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treatments. First, to analyze the impact of intermediate prize we include the H treatment. In the H
treatment, there is no intermediate prize (d = 0), otherwise it is identical to the HI treatment.
Second, to analyze the impact of luck we consider an alternative value for the exponent r. In the
LI treatment, the exponent is low (r = 0.4), otherwise it is identical to the HI treatment. In all
three treatments the value of the final prize is v = 100 experimental francs. Table 1 presents the
equilibrium efforts in each round, the expected payoffs, and the probability of contest ending in
two rounds for all three treatments.
The theoretical predictions in Table 1 suggest several hypotheses. The first two concern
comparative statics:
Hypothesis 1: Comparing HI versus H treatment, (a) intermediate prizes lead to higher
effort in all rounds by both players; (b) intermediate prizes reduce the probability of contest
ending in two rounds.
Hypothesis 2: Comparing HI versus LI treatment, (a) lower r leads to lower effort in all
rounds by both players; (b) lower r reduces the probability of contest ending in two rounds.
The next two hypotheses concern the features of strategic momentum:
Hypothesis 3: In HI and H treatments, (a) round 1 winner exerts more effort in round 2
than round 1 loser. In LI treatment, (b) both winner and loser of round 1 exert the same effort in
round 2.
Hypothesis 4: In all treatments, round 2 winner exerts the same effort in round 3 as
round 2 loser.
Note that evidence in favor of Hypothesis 3b and Hypothesis 4 provides evidence against
psychological momentum.
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3.2. Experimental Procedures
A total of 108 subjects participated in nine sessions with 12 subjects per session. All
subjects were undergraduate students at Chapman University. Subjects participated in only one
session of this study, although some subjects had previously participated in other unrelated
economics experiments.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). No communication between subjects was permitted and all choices and information were
transmitted via computer terminals. Each experimental session proceeded in two parts: a risk
assessment part and a best-of-three contest part. Subjects were given the instructions, available in
the Appendix, at the beginning of each part. The experimenter read the instructions aloud, so the
information contained therein is assumed to be common knowledge. Subjects then completed an
online quiz to verify their understanding of the instructions. The experiment started only after all
subjects had completed the quiz, and explanations were provided for any incorrect answers. In
the risk assessment part of the experiment, subjects made 15 choices in simple lotteries, similar
to Holt and Laury (2002). This method was used to elicit subjects‟ risk preferences. In the
contest part of the experiment, subjects participated in 20 periods of play in one of the three
treatments. In each period, subjects were randomly and anonymously placed into 6 groups with 2
players in each group. In each round subjects made their bids (no more than 200 francs) and after
all subjects submitted their bids, the computer chose the winner of that round by implementing a
lottery with probabilities defined by the relevant contest success function. All subjects were
informed that by increasing their bids, they would increase their chance of winning the round and
that, regardless of who wins the round, all subjects would have to pay their bids. At the end of
each round the computer displayed own bid, opponent‟s bid, and the result of the lottery draw. A
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period lasted for either two or three rounds. The period ended when one of the players in the
group won two rounds. At the end of each period subjects were subjects were randomly regrouped to form new two-player groups.
At the end of the experiment, 2 out of 20 periods in the contest part of the experiment
were randomly selected for payment. The sum of the earnings for these 2 periods was exchanged
at rate of 25 experimental francs = US $1. Subjects were also paid for 1 out of the 15 decisions
made in the risk assessment part of the experiment. All subjects received an initial endowment of
$15 to cover potential losses. On average, subjects earned $20 each, which was paid
anonymously and in cash. The experimental sessions lasted about 90 minutes.

4. Results
4.1. Comparative Statics Results
Table 2 summarizes the average effort in each round, total effort and payoffs, and the
likelihood of contest ending in two rounds. Figure 1 displays the time series of average total
effort over all 20 periods. Consistent with other experimental studies of contests we find
persistent and significant over-dissipation in all three treatments. In Section 4.3, we explore the
possible reasons for this over-dissipation. Note that although subjects expend significantly more
effort than predicted, aggregate effort patterns remain sensitive to the Nash prediction.
Comparing across treatments, total effort in all three treatments is in qualitative agreement with
the equilibrium predictions (average total effort is 76.3 in HI, 60.8 in H and 58.2 in LI). Based on
the estimation of a random-effect model with standard errors clustered at session level and
subject-level random effects, we find that the total effort expended in the HI treatment is
significantly higher than the effort expended in the H treatment (p-value < 0.01) and the LI

11

treatment (p-value < 0.01). This finding lends strong empirical support for Hypothesis 1a and 2a.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the observed effort does not fall in proportion to the
predicted level. Comparing HI and H treatment, total effort is predicted to be 37% lower in the H
treatment but is actually only 20% lower. The comparison for HI and LI treatment yields even
bigger differences. Effort in the LI treatment is predicted to be 58% lower than the HI treatment,
but the decrease in effort is less than half of prediction (24%).
Result 1: Intermediate prizes lead to significantly higher effort by both players (HI vs. H)
while lower r leads to significantly lower effort (HI vs. LI).
Theory also predicts that intermediate prizes and exponent r influence the probability of
contest ending in two rounds. In qualitative agreement with the equilibrium predictions, data
indicates that the probability of contest ending in round 2 decreases with intermediate prizes
(0.61 in H vs. 0.58 in HI) and with lower r (0.58 in HI vs. 0.51 in LI). Based on estimation of a
random-effect probit model with subject-level random effects, we find that the difference is
significant when comparing HI and LI treatment (p-value < 0.05), but not when comparing H
and HI treatment (p-value = 0.2). This finding lends partial empirical support to Hypothesis 1b
and 2b.
Result 2: The probability of contest ending in two rounds is significantly lower with
lower r (HI vs. LI), but is not significantly lower with intermediate prizes (HI vs. H)

4.2. Strategic and Psychological Momentum
Table 2 and Figures 2, 3 and 4 display the average effort choices by players in each of the
three rounds. Theory predicts that in the HI and H treatments, winner of round 1 should have
strategic momentum (Hypothesis 3). We find strong support for this in the data. Effort in round 2
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by the winner of round 1 exceeds that of the loser (HI: p-value < 0.05 and H: p-value <0.01).
Accordingly, the likelihood that round 1 winner wins the overall contest remains greater than 50
percent in both treatments (HI: 58 and H: 61 percent). Of course, it is possible that part or all of
this momentum in round 2 of the HI and H treatments is due to psychological momentum. The
second round of the LI treatment offers a more discriminating test. Here, theory predicts no
strategic momentum in round 2, i.e. the outcome of round 1 does not influence either player‟s
effort choices in round 2. However, if psychological momentum is present then the round 1
winner should expend higher effort than the loser. Our data indicates that effort chosen by round
1 winner in round 2 is not significantly different from that chosen by round 1 loser (24.4 vs. 23.3,
p-value = 0.16). This means that round 1 winner is no more likely to win round 2. Our finding
that the probability of contest ending in round 2 remains close to prediction (51 vs. 50 percent) is
consistent with this result, suggesting no psychological momentum in round 2 of the LI
treatment.5
Result 3: In HI and H treatments, effort in round 2 by round 1 winner is significantly
higher than effort by round 1 loser, so the contest is more likely to end in two rounds. In LI
treatment, effort in round 2 by round 1 winner is not significantly different from the effort by
round 1 loser, so the contest is equally likely to end in two rounds as in three.
Turning to round 3, theory predicts there should not be any strategic momentum. Both
players should exert the same effort in round 3 (Hypothesis 4). However, there may be
psychological momentum, as success or failure in the second round may affect players in the
third round. Using panel data analysis with subject specific random effects and robust standard

5

These results are further substantiated by probit models that include subject random effects, session fixed effects
and a time trend. We find that in HI and H treatments, the likelihood of winning round 2 is higher for round 1
winner (p-value < 0.01); but in case of LI treatment, round 1 winner is no more likely to win round 2 than round 1
loser (p-value = 0.45).
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errors, we find no difference in the round 3 effort chosen by the winner of round 2 compared to
the loser of round 2 (H: p-value = 0.61; HI: p-value = 0.21; LI: p-value = 0.31). This again
suggests lack of psychological momentum.
Result 4: In all treatments, effort in round 3 by round 2 winner is not significantly
different than effort by round 2 loser.
Taken together, Results 3 and 4, allow us to convincingly state that the momentum in the
second round of the HI and H treatments, which results in a greater likelihood of the contest
ending in two rounds, is a result of strategic considerations and not psychological impetus.

4.3. Over-dissipation
At the beginning of Section 4.1, we noted a striking feature of the data: in all three
treatments, subjects over-expend effort relative to the risk-neutral Nash predictions. As is evident
from Table 2 and Figure 1, the magnitude of this difference is large and persistent over time. In
the H and LI treatments, average total effort is around twice the equilibrium prediction (H: 60.8
versus 32; LI: 58.2 versus 21.3), and in the HI treatment average total effort is about 50 percent
larger (76.3 versus 50.5).6 Such over-dissipation is not uncommon in experimental literature on
contests and similar findings are also reported in Davis and Reilly (1998), Potters et al. (1998),
and Sheremeta (2010a, 2010b). One simple explanation for over-dissipation is inexperience. For
example, Davis and Reilly (1998) show that overbidding decreases but does not disappear with

6

To find empirical support for these conclusions we estimated a simple panel regression separately for each
treatment over all 20 periods. The random effects model included total effort as the dependent variable and a
constant and a time trend as the independent variables. The model included random efforts error structure
(individual subjects) and the standard errors were clustered at the session level. A standard Wald test, conducted on
the estimates of the model, finds that for all treatments the constant coefficients are significantly higher than the
predicted theoretical values (p-value < 0.01). If we restrict the analysis to last 10 periods (where the behavior has
stabilized), the over-dissipation result holds for the HI and LI treatment (p-value < 0.05), but effort in the H
treatment is not different from prediction (p-value = 0.2).
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time. Regression using data for all 20 periods show that the coefficient on a time trend (1/period)
is positive and significant, which suggests that individual learning is taking place, and that with
repetition subjects expend lower efforts.7 This is also evident in Figure 1. Nevertheless, the
difference between predicted and observed effort level remains significant even in the last 5
periods (p-value < 0.01). As a result of this over-dissipation, the observed payoffs in all three
treatments are significantly lower than expected (p-value < 0.01).
Result 5: There is significant aggregate over-dissipation in all treatments. The level of
over-dissipation decreases over time, but remains positive and significant.
Furthermore, it is important to note that while over-dissipation does not distort the
qualitative comparative statics results (Results 1 and 2), it does influence the quantitative
analysis. For example, when testing Hypotheses 1 and 2, we observed that the effort does not fall
in proportion to the predicted level. Also, contrary to the prediction of a substantial drop in effort
by round 1 loser, we find that both round 1 winner and loser increase their effort in round 2. This
over-dissipation in round 2 efforts by both players can explain why equilibrium over-predicts the
probability of the contest ending in two rounds (HI: 63 vs. 58 and H: 75 vs. 61).
There are a number of other explanations for over-dissipation in contests. One common
explanation is that most subjects are likely to make mistakes (Lim et al., 2010; Sheremeta,
2010a). Bullock and Rutstrom (2007) and Sheremeta (2010a) show how quantal response
equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), which accounts for individual errors, can explain
some of the over-dissipation observed in lottery contests. Another explanation for overdissipation is based on the evolutionary argument (Leininger, 2003; Hehenkamp et al., 2004;
Riechmann, 2007). Evolutionary behavior postulates that players aim to beat each other, i.e. the
tenet of „rational payoff maximization‟ is replaced by „relative payoff maximization.‟ For a two7

If we restrict the analysis to last 10 periods, time trend is significant only for the LI treatment (p-value < 0.05).
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player single-round Tullock contest, the effort in an evolutionary stable equilibrium is twice the
effort in the Nash equilibrium (Hehenkamp et al., 2004; Lim et al., 2010).8 Another oft-cited
explanation is based on judgmental biases and misperception of probabilities (Baharad and
Nitzan, 2008; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010). Many studies on individual behavior provide
evidence that subjects misperceive probabilities in a systematic way – they assign over-weight to
lower probability of winning and under-weight to higher probability of winning (Prelec, 1998,
Wu and Gonzales, 1996; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). This misperception and the resulting
errors are explored by Parco et al. (2005) and Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009) as an explanation
for observed over-dissipation in lottery contests. Finally, recent experiments have found
evidence that subjects have a non-monetary utility of winning a Tullock contest, and this can
partially explain overdissipation of effort (Parco et al., 2005; Amaldoss and Rapoport, 2009;
Sheremeta, 2010b).9
All the above arguments can at least partially explain the over-dissipation documented in
Result 5. However, we also provide an additional explanation for over-dissipation that is specific
to our experiment: the sunk cost hypothesis. In an economic analysis of a best-of-three contests,
effort expenditures in earlier rounds are sunk costs. Therefore, rational subjects should not let
these previous expenditures affect their effort choices in current rounds. Evidence from various
behavioral studies, however, suggests otherwise (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Friedman et al.
2010).10 In our experiment, subjects who get to the third round have already expended some

8

This quest to seek higher (expected) payoff than others is consistent with „spite effect‟ contended by Hamilton
(1970) or „survival of the fittest‟ contended by Alchian (1950). Vriend (2000) and Reichmann (2006) show that
learning by imitation of successful others is also equivalent to maximizing relative payoffs.
9
Sheremeta (2010b) provides evidence for such non-monetary utility, by documenting that about 50% of subjects
are willing to exert positive effort (thereby incurring monetary costs) in order to be the winner of a contest with the
prize value of 0.
10
In the literature, the mechanism underlying this „irrational escalation of commitment‟ is attributed to cognitive
dissonance (Festinger, 1957), self-justification (Aronson, 1968) and prospect theory or loss aversion (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1979).
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positive effort in the previous two rounds. If the sunk cost hypothesis is true, subjects who
expend more effort in rounds 1 and 2 are also more likely to expend higher effort in the final
decisive round. Based on a simple random effect regression, we find that there is a positive
relationship between effort in round 3 and total effort in the previous two rounds (p-value <
0.01). This holds true irrespective of whether we use aggregate or treatment-specific data.
Therefore, the sunk cost hypothesis may partially account for over-dissipation in our experiment.

4.4. Heterogeneous Behavior
Figure 5 displays the total effort of individual subjects in all three treatments. Contrary to
a unique pure-strategy Nash prediction, there is substantial variation in effort choices across
subjects. For instance, in the LI treatment, total effort is predicted to be 21.3, but instead the
individual effort choices range from 26.5 to 102.4. Similar behavior is observed in the HI and H
treatment.
Result 6: There is strong heterogeneity in effort between subjects.
A common explanation is that individual efforts are heterogeneous because subjects who
make these effort choices have heterogeneous preferences. Following Millner and Pratt (1991)
and Sheremeta (2010a), we postulate that, to some extent, heterogeneity in effort in our
experiment can be explained by heterogeneity in individual risk preferences. Recall that in the
first part of our experiment, subjects participated in a simple lottery choice experiment that was
designed to elicit a measure of risk aversion. The experiment contained 15 lottery choices subjects were asked to state whether they preferred safe option A or risky option B. Option A
yielded $1 payoff with certainty, while option B yielded a payoff of either $3 or $0. The
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probability of receiving $3 or $0 varied across all 15 lotteries.11 These probabilities were
structured such that the expected payoff of the safe option A exceeded that of the risky option B
for the first 7 decisions, while option B had a higher payoff for the last 8 decisions. Therefore, a
risk-averse subject will choose option A more than 7 times while a risk-seeking subject will
choose option A fewer than 7 times. Following Holt and Laury (2002), we use the point at which
subjects switch from the safe option to the risky option to define a range of values for the risk
aversion parameter. These ranges are reported in Table 3 for a constant relative risk aversion
utility function. Our subject pool is typical in the sense that a majority of our subjects show a
tendency towards risk-averse behavior (HI: 72 percent, H: 77.9 percent; LI: 76.2 percent).
Table 3 also displays the treatment-specific average effort corresponding to the number
of safe choices made by the subjects. In the theoretical literature, the effect of risk aversion on
effort in contests is ambiguous and depends on the assumptions of the model.12 Random effects
regressions that control for subject-level effect and cluster on sessions collaborate with this. In
the H treatment, total effort is negatively correlated with the number of safe choices, thereby
indicating that risk-averse subjects expend less effort. This observation is consistent with
findings of other contest experiments where r = 1 (Millner and Pratt, 1991; Anderson and
Freeborn, 2009; Sheremeta, 2010a). Inclusion of intermediate prizes, however, dilutes the impact
of risk aversion, and the coefficient on risk aversion is marginally negative and insignificant for
the HI treatment. Finally, in the LI treatment, where luck plays a relatively large role, we find
that risk averse players expend more effort (p-value < 0.05). Therefore, the differences in risk
11

The first lottery offered a 0% chance of winning $3 and a 100% chance of winning $0, while the last lottery
offered a 70% chance of winning $3 and a 30% chance of winning $0.
12
Hillman and Katz (1984) showed that risk averse players should expend lower effort than risk neutral players, and
risk seeking players should exert higher effort. Treich (2009) established that risk aversion always reduces effort if
risk averse players are also „prudent‟. Nitzan (1991) showed that if agents are risk averse, the degree of underdissipation is inversely related to the degree of risk aversion. Konrad and Schlesinger (1997), on the other hand,
showed that "it is possible for the contest with risk-averse players to dissipate more of the rents than the same
contest with risk-neutral players" (Konrad and Schlesinger, 1997, p. 1677).
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preferences and the fact that such preferences are correlated with effort decisions, may explain
some of the heterogeneity in effort between subjects.

6. Conclusion
In this paper, we use controlled laboratory environment to investigate the pattern of
outcomes and efforts in a best-of-three contest that includes both intermediate prizes and a
varying role of luck. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that instituting
intermediate prizes increases both the individual effort and the length of the contest. Conversely,
players are unwilling to expend higher effort when luck plays an increasingly greater role in
determining the winner. We observe strategic momentum in situations for which it is predicted,
and we do not observe psychological momentum.
Our experiment provides direct empirical evidence that can be instructive in the design of
optimal contests. Contest design has been a topic of extensive theoretical and empirical
investigation primarily because contest objectives vary greatly – contests can be designed to
generate highest revenue or to minimize social waste. For instance, in sporting tournaments it is
often desirable to induce the players to spend the maximal amount of effort, or to induce an
effort allocation that increases the chance of a close contest, with the objective of enhancing the
excitement level of the tournament. Our experimental results indicate that this is best achieved
by instituting intermediate prizes, and by making the contest more deterministic (i.e. reduce the
random extraneous factors such as luck in determining the winner). In other rent seeking
activities, such as political campaigns and patent races, the objective might be to minimize longdrawn contests and the accompanying wasteful expenditure. We find that it is best achieved by
implementing only the grand prize (e.g., in U.S primaries, only the candidate to win a majority of
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their party delegates wins the party nomination; or in a patent race, only the first firm to finish
the invention discovery process is awarded the patent protection).
To simplify the exposition we abstract from a number of issues that are nevertheless
important in the field. For instance, we assume that there are only two players, and that they are
symmetric. However, qualitative predictions of model do not change substantially when there are
more than two players (Klumpp and Polborn, 2006). Furthermore, if one player has an
exogenous advantage over the other, the ex ante advantage adds to the strategic momentum and
further increases the probability of win by the skilled player.
Finally, although the focus of this paper has been comparative statics and pattern of
effort, our results show that over-dissipation in contests is a robust phenomenon and is worthy of
further investigation. We conjecture that best-of-three contests can provide a good platform for
an explicit evaluation of some of the possible explanations for over-dissipation discussed above.
This would involve both theoretical and experimental analysis. Theoretical work may be aimed
at explaining the descriptive limitations of Nash equilibrium in these contests. For example, it
may be possible to derive an evolutionary stable equilibrium for the entire best-of-three contest.
Experimental investigation can then compare the predictions of this model to predictions based
on the various competing explanations for over-dissipation.
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Table 1: Experimental Design and Predictions
Treatments
Final prize, v
Intermediate prize, d
Exponent, r
Equilibrium predictions
Effort in R1
Effort in R2 by R1 winner
Effort in R2 by R1 loser
Effort in R3 by R2 winner
Effort in R3 by R2 loser
The probability of ending in R2
Expected average effort
Expected payoff

H
100
0
1

HI
100
25
1

LI
100
25
0.4

16.4
14.1
4.7
25.0
25.0
0.75
32.0
18.0

21.2
22.0
13.2
31.3
31.3
0.63
50.5
29.2

7.5
7.5
7.5
12.5
12.5
0.5
21.3
60.0

Table 2: Summary Statistics
Treatments
Final prize, v
Intermediate prize, d
Exponent, r
Effort in R1
Effort in R2 by R1 winner
Effort in R2 by R1 loser
Effort in R3 by R2 winner
Effort in R3 by R2 loser
The probability of ending in R2
Expected average effort
Expected payoff

H
100
0
1
Equilibrium
Actual
16.4
22.2 (0.6)
14.1
28.5 (0.9)
4.7
23.5 (1.0)
25.0
33.2 (1.5)
25.0
31.7 (1.5)
0.75
0.61 (0.02)
32.0
60.8 (1.5)
18.0
-10.9 (2.1)

HI
100
25
1
Equilibrium
Actual
21.2
27.2 (0.6)
22.0
37.0 (1.0)
13.2
28.1 (0.9)
31.3
40.6 (1.4)
31.3
38.1 (1.3)
0.63
0.58 (0.02)
50.5
76.3 (1.5)
29.2
4.0 (2.7)

LI
100
25
0.4
Equilibrium
Actual
7.5
22.3 (0.4)
7.5
24.4 (0.6)
7.5
23.3 (0.6)
12.5
25.3 (0.9)
12.5
24.3 (0.8)
0.5
0.51 (0.02)
21.3
58.2 (1.0)
60.0
22.9 (2.7)

Table 3: Lottery choices and Risk Aversion (n = 100)*
Percentage of Subject and Total Effort
Number
Range of Relative
of Safe
Risk Preference
HI Treatment
H treatment
LI Treatment
Risk Aversion, ρ
Choices
(n = 640)
(n = 700)
(n = 660)
0-1
ρ < -1.73
0.0
2.9
57.8
0.0
2
-1.73 < ρ < -1.10
0.0
0.0
0.0
3
-1.10 < ρ < -0.73
0.0
0.0
0.0
4
-0.73 < ρ < -0.46
Risk loving
0.0
0.0
0.0
5
-0.46 < ρ < -0.26
6.3
71.9
2.9
83.3
3.0
26.5
6
-0.26 < ρ < -0.10
6.3
78.9
2.9
86.4
6.1
56.7
7
-0.10 < ρ < 0.04
Risk neutral
15.6
75.8
14.3
67.3
15.2
49.7
8
0.04 < ρ < 0.17
9.4
94.2
14.3
50.8
18.2
61.5
9
0.17 < ρ < 0.27
15.6
69.0
14.3
72.5
21.2
58.1
10
0.27 < ρ < 0.37
28.1
71.4
22.9
61.1
15.6
55.3
11
0.37 < ρ < 0.46
Risk averse
6.3
90.4
8.9
52.6
3.03
75.1
12
0.46 < ρ < 0.54
6.3
62.5
8.9
48.7
15.12
73.2
13
0.54 < ρ < 0.61
6.3
80.0
0.0
0.0
14
0.61 < ρ < 0.68
0.0
5.7
63.6
3.0
30.5
15
0.68 < ρ
0.0
2.9
30.2
0.0
*We dropped 8 subjects who were inconsistent in switching between Option A and Option B. Number of
subjects (n) is 32 in HI treatment, 35 in the H treatment and 33 in the LI treatment.
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Figure 1: Total Effort over all 20 periods
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Figure 2: Effort across 3 rounds (HI Treatment)
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Figure 3: Effort across 3 rounds (H Treatment)
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Figure 4: Effort across 3 rounds (LI Treatment)
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Figure 5: Total Effort by Individual Subjects across Treatments
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Appendix – Instructions for HI Treatment (Not for Publication)
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various research agencies have
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and make appropriate
decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money.
The experiment will proceed in two parts. Each part contains decision problems that require you to make a
series of economic choices which determine your total earnings. The currency used in Part 1 of the experiment is
U.S. Dollars. The currency used in Part 2 of the experiment is francs. These francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars
at a rate of _25_ francs to _1_ dollar. You have already received a $20.00 participation fee (this includes your showup fee of $7.00). Your earnings from both Part 1 and Part 2 of the experiment will be incorporated into your
participation fee. At the end of today‟s experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. There are 12 participants
in today‟s experiment.
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people‟s work. If you have any
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk,
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your
cooperation.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. How
much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. The decision problems are not
designed to test you. What we want to know is what choices you would make in them. The only right answer is what
you really would choose.
For each line in the table in the next page, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that
there are a total of 15 lines in the table but only one line will be randomly selected for payment. Each line is equally
likely to be selected, and you do not know which line will be selected when you make your choices. Hence you
should pay attention to the choice you make in every line. After you have completed all your choices a token will be
randomly drawn out of a bingo cage containing tokens numbered from 1 to 15. The token number determines which
line is going to be selected for payment.
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option A in that line,
you will receive $1. If you chose option B in that line, you will receive either $3 or $0. To determine your earnings
in the case you chose option B there will be second random draw. A token will be randomly drawn out of the bingo
cage now containing twenty tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token number is then compared with the numbers in
the line selected (see the table). If the token number shows up in the left column you earn $3. If the token number
shows up in the right column you earn $0.
While you have all the information in the table, we ask you that you input all your 15 decisions into the
computer. The actual earnings for this part will be determined at the end of part 2, and will be independent of part 2
earnings.
Deci
Please
Opti
Option
sion
choose
on A
B
no.
A or B
1
$3 never
$0 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
2
$3 if 1 comes out of the bingo cage
$0 if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
3
$3 if 1 or 2
$0 if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
4
$3 if 1,2,3
$0 if 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
5
$3 if 1,2,3,4,
$0 if 5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
6
$3 if 1,2,3,4,5
$0 if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
7
$3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6
$0 if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
8
$3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
$0 if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
9
$3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8
$0 if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
10
$3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9
$0 if 10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
11
$3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
$0 if 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
12
$3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11
$0 if 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
13
$3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12
$0 if 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
14
$3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13
$0 if 14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
15
$3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
$0 if 15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2
YOUR DECISION
The second part of the experiment consists of 20 decision-making periods. The 12 participants in today‟s
experiment will be randomly re-matched every period into 6 groups with 2 participants in each group. Therefore, the
specific person who is the other participant in your group will change randomly after each period. The group
assignment is anonymous, so you will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to your group
Each period consists of a maximum of three rounds. The period ends when one of the participants wins
two of the three rounds ("best of three"). Thus, each period will consist of either two or three rounds. In each round,
you and the other participant in your group will simultaneously make a bid (any number, including 0.1 decimal
points). Your bid in each round cannot exceed 100 francs. The more you bid, the more likely you are to win a
particular round. This will be explained in more detail later. Your earnings depend on the number of rounds you won
and how many francs you spent on bidding. An example of your decision screen is shown below in Figure 1:
Figure 1 – Decision Screen

There are two types of rewards that you may receive during each period: big reward and small reward.
The big reward is worth 100 francs and the small reward is worth 25 francs to you and the other participant in your
group. The winner of an individual round will receive the small reward, while the participant who is first to win
two rounds receives, in addition, the big reward. The period ends as soon as the big reward winner is determined.
CHANCE OF WINNING A ROUND
You can never guarantee that you will win a round. However, the greater your bid relative to the other
participant‟s bid, the greater your probability of winning the round. That is, the more you bid, the more likely you
are to win a round. The more the other participant in your group bids, the less likely you are to win a round.
Specifically, your chance of winning a round is given by the following expression.
(Your Bid)
Your chance of
=
winning a round
(Your Bid) + (The Other Participant‟s Bid)
Think of this in the following way. For each franc you bid you will receive lottery tickets. For example, if
you bid 10 francs and the other participant bid 20 francs, you will receive 10 lottery tickets and the other participant
will receive 20 lottery tickets. At the end of each round the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the
tickets purchased by you and the other participant in your group. The owner of the drawn ticket wins the round. In
the example above, your chance of winning the round is 0.33 = 10/(10+20) and the other participant‟s chance of
winning is 0.67 = 20/(10+20). Note that your chance of winning a round is proportional to the amount of lottery
tickets purchased by you and the other participant.
In the sheet attached to these instructions, you will find a probability table. This table will give you some
idea of how your bid and the other participant‟s bid affect your chance of winning. For instance, suppose you bid 50
francs and the other participant bid 30 francs then your chance of winning the round is 0.63. Note that as stated
before, your chance of winning increases as your bid increases relative to the other participant‟s bid. So if you bid
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70 francs and the other participant is still bidding 30 francs, your chance of winning increases to 0.70. To assist you
with calculation of more precise numbers, we will provide you with the Excel calculator in each round. You may use
the calculator to find the chance of winning for any combination of your bid and the other participant‟s bid. We will
have a few practice rounds with the Excel calculator before the start of the experiment.
YOUR EARNINGS
Your earnings depend on the number of rounds you won and how many francs you spent on bidding in
each round. For each round you win you receive a small reward. The participant who is first to win two rounds
receives, in addition, the big reward. One of the four payment scenarios is possible:
(1) If the period lasted for only two rounds
(1a) Earnings of the participant who won both rounds are =
= (big reward) + (2 × small reward) – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2)
= 100 + 2 × 25 – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2)
(1b) Earnings of the participant who won neither rounds are =
= 0 – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2)
(2) If the period lasted for three rounds
(2a) Earnings of the participant who won two rounds are =
= (big reward) + (2 × small reward) – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2) - (bid in round 3)
= 100 + 2 × 25 – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2) - (bid in round 3)
(2b) Earnings of the participant who won one round are =
= (1 × small reward) – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2) - (bid in round 3)
= 1 × 25 – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2) - (bid in round 3)
Please note that regardless of who wins the round, both participants will have to pay their bids.
END OF THE ROUND
After both participants make their round bids, the computer will make a random draw which will determine
the winner of the round. Both participants will observe the outcome of the round – your bid, other participant‟s bid
and winner, as shown in Figure 2. Then they make bids in another round. This continues until one of the participants
in the group wins two rounds.
Figure 2 – Intermediate Screen

END OF THE PERIOD
The period ends when one of the participants in the group wins two rounds. At the end of the period, the
computer will calculate your period earnings based on the number of rounds you won and how many francs you
spent on bidding in each round. Your earnings from that period will be reported on the outcome screen as shown in
Figure 3. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal
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Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. You will be randomly re-matched with a different participant at the
start of the next period.
Figure 3 – Outcome Screen

END OF THE EXPERIMENT
At the end of the experiment we will use the bingo cage to randomly select 2 out of 20 periods for actual
payment. Depending on the outcome in a given period, you may receive either positive or negative earnings. You
will sum the total earnings for these 2 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment, as shown on the last page
of your personal record sheet. Remember you have already received a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 500
francs). If your earnings from this part of the experiment are positive, we will add them to your participation fee. If
your earnings are negative, we will subtract them from your participation fee.
Are there any questions?
Before we begin this part of the experiment, we request that you fill the following questionnaire. The only
purpose of the questionnaire is to check your understanding of the instructions. The experiment will start as soon as
everyone has completed the questionnaire and we have addressed any doubts or concerns. We will start with a few
practice rounds with the Excel probability calculator.
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